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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/03/2011

Accident number: 676

Accident time: 08:25

Accident Date: 20/06/2010

Where it occurred: Task No: 364/469B,
Swailmah village, Al
Mafraq Prvince, NE
Sector

Country: Jordan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: Not recorded

ID original source: None

Name of source: Demining group

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M14 AP blast

Ground condition: hard
rocks/stones
Date last modified: 06/03/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: 36. 13957 E

Map north: 32. 52343 N

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
standing to excavate (?)
use of rake (?)
long handtool may have reduced injury (?)
non injurious accident (?)
disciplinary action against victim (?)
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Accident report
A report of this accident was made available by the demining group involved in late 2010. Its
conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in
square brackets [ ] is editorial.
The internal investigation report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Incident investigation for [Demining group] – MINE ACTION TEAM - JORDAN
Task Name: Swailmeh 4 (364/369b), north border project, north east SECTOR
GRID REF: 32. 52343 N: 36. 13957 E, Village Name: swailmeh
Investigation conducted by – [Demining group]
Victim deminer: [Name removed], DATE OF BIRTH: [Not recorded], NIC NO: [Removed]
TEAM LEADER: [Name removed], Team: Golf
TIME OF INCIDENT: 08:25 hrs, DATE OF INCIDENT: 20 June 2010
NATURE OF INJURY: no injuries, TYPE OF MINE: M14 Anti-Personal

IMSMA DETAILED REPORT FOR MINE INCIDENT Sunday, 20 June 2010
Part 1 – Description of the incident
1. Organisation name: [Demining group], JORDAN, Team No: Golf
2. Incident date: 20 June 2010, Time: 08:25 hrs
3. Location of incident: NE SECTOR, Province: AL Mafraq, Village: Swailmah, Project or task
No: 364/469B
4. Name of site manager or team leader: [Name removed]
5. Type of incident: uncontrolled detonation of a mine
6. Device was detonated by: Deminer
7. Device detonated while: Raking with Heavy Rake
8. Device was found in an area classified as: a known hazardous area
9. Narrative (Describe how the incident happened. Attach additional pages and photographs
or diagrams to assist in clarifying the circumstances surrounding the incident):
While the deminer try to investigate a signal indicated by the metal detector in an expected
site of an AP M14 mine, the deminer didn’t approach the signal in the proper procedure and
hit the mine with the heavy Rake on the pressure plate which activated the mine and caused
the blast 200 away from the deminer
Part 2 – Injuries
10. Did the incident result in any injuries? No
11. List people injured and nature of injury: [Name removed], Deminer, No Injury
Part 3 – Equipment damages
12. Did the incident result in any damage to equipment or property? Yes
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13. List any mine action equipment or property damage
Heavy Rake, Damaged (not reusable)

[The bent rake-head.]
14. List damage to equipment or property owned by a member of the public or the
government. Include contact details of the owner or responsible person. [None]
Part 4 – Explosive hazard
15. Provide details of mines/UXO/ other devices that were involved in the incident.
Device Type:
AP (Blast) Mine

Method:

Determined by:

Buried

Raking

16. State specific device (if known): Anti-Personal Mine, M14
17. Comments (include measurements of any crater resulting from the explosion): Crater
Depth: approx. 8 cm / Width: approx. 30 cm
Part 5 - Site conditions
18. Describe the conditions at the site at time of the incident
Ground/Terrain: hard, flat, open
Weather: Clear, mild
Vegetation: medium, burnt, grass
Part 6 – Team and task details
20. Qualifications of Member(s) involved in the incident:
[The Victim], Deminer
21. How long had this team been?
a. At this site? 1 Month & 3 weeks
b. working on this task? 1 Month & 3 weeks
c. working on the day? 2 Hours & 0 minutes
22. Detector type: F3, Serial Number: [Not recorded], Detector status: Functional: Passed to
[Name removed] for technical inspection at Swailmeh 4 Site on 20 of June 201. Tripwire
feeler used? No
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23. Hand tool: HEAVY RAKE
24. PPE: Vest, Visor, [blast boots]
25. Comments: [None]
Part 7 - Medical & First Aid
Medical treatment required? no
26. Medical Support at Incident Site: Medic, 1st Aid Kit, Stretcher, Ambulance, Radio to call
forward medic.
27. Was a Mine Incident Drill carried out? Yes
28. Time and distance data
a. Time from incident to SECTION MEDICAL POINT: (1) minutes
b. Time spent at site administering treatment: (NA)
c. Time from evacuation FROM to arrival King Abdullah Hospital: Not Applicable.
Part 8 – Reporting procedures
Reported by: [Name removed], [Demining group] Jaber Office to: [Demining group] Offices &
NCDR
Investigation conducted by: [Name removed]
Report compiled/translated by: [Name removed], [Name removed]
Verified by: [Name removed]

Findings:
Approaching drill to the target not as per as SOP.
No use for the marking system.

No use for base stick during the work.
No use for the light rake.
Signed: Tech &Ver. Coord.

Operations manager analysis and recommendations
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The deminer tend to use the heavy RAKE more than the light RAKE to investigate the
indicated signals by the metal detector and didn’t follow the proper procedure to identify the
centre of the signal and approach the signal 20 cm from one of the sides.
The individual mistake and the size of the pressure plate of the M14 with using the RAKE to
investigate the signals will give the chance to have a non control detonation ,
The result from all the similar incidents with the usage of the proper PPE and the safe
distance between the deminer and the target that the handle of the RAKE keep (2m) will
insure the safety of the deminer
In the case of [the Victim] the concerns came from the way that the deminer following in
detecting and investigating and marking the processed area. He most likely didn’t follow the
proper procedures and this unfortunately the second time for him that he already received a
written warning for a similar case 3 months ago and he repeated the same mistake.
The recommendations is to give the deminer a final written warning and bring the attention
for the team leader to give more focus on the deminer to make sure that he will not be in a
danger and if he commit any mistake he have to be suspended directly and terminated.

Attachments:
Statements by Injured Members
Statements by Witnesses
Photographs of Injuries
Photographs of Incident Site

Victim Report
Victim number: 859

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: N/A

Time to hospital: N/A

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Mask
visor, blast boots

Mask Visor
blast boots

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT: No injuries recorded. A photograph of the Victim showed no injuries.
No medical report was made available.

Statements
Statement 1: the Victim
I was searching for 12 o’clock mine using the detector when I found a signal I located it, and
started to get closer according to the SOP, as I made the visual check and used the light rake
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then started using the heavy rake when the accident happened while am using the heavy
rake, I left it and got out of the field to the ambulance area.
Q: Was the exploded mine visible?
A: No, it wasn’t.
Q: Was the detector working well before the accident?
A: Yes, it was.
Q: Did the team leader check on your work before the accident?
A: Yes, he did.
Q: Were all the mines you cleared visible that day?
A: Some of them superficial and others on 10 cm depth nothing more.
Q: Were you having any problem at work that day?
A: No, but the land was so hard which made me to hacking while using the heavy rake.

Statement: Team Leader
At the beginning of that working day I gave the team the full safety brief, then distributed them
to their sites, and I started checking on the injured deminer and he was working well and I
didn’t notice any mistake he made, I reminded him with the safety brief and headed to the
other deminers, at 8:25 am I heard a sound of explosion when I was heading again to the
injured I entered the lane to see what happened to find him walking outside the field to the
ambulance area.
Q: Did you inform those responsible about the accident according to the SOP?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Did you notice anything wrong with the injured that day?
A: No, he was working very well.
Q: How do you evaluate [the Victim’s] work?
A: He works very well, his productivity is very good but maybe he pulled hard on the heavy
rake because of the nature of the land there which is so hard which made the accident.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim
was working without marking or a base stick and hacking at the ground with rake. Although
the hard ground may have made the use of the rake correctly extremely slow, the marking
errors should have been corrected. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control
Inadequacy because the group’s management did not seem to recognise the failings of the
field controllers.
The demining group’s concern to investigate accidents, correct errors and share accident
reports indicates a commendable professionalism.
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